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Abstract This article focuses on tracing and extendingMichel Foucault’s contributions
to the philosophy of technology. At first sight his work on power seems the most
relevant. In his later work on subjectivation and ethics technology is absent. However,
notably by recombining Foucault’s work on power with his work on subjectivation, does
his work contribute to solving pertinent problems in current approaches to the ethics of
technology. First, Foucault’s position is compared to critical theory and Heidegger, and
associated with the approach of “technical mediation” (Latour, Ihde, Verbeek). Next, a
detailed study of Discipline and Punish, results in the identification of two distinct
“figures of technical mediation”. Finally, Foucault’s later work on ethics and
subjectivation is employed to elaborate an ethics of technology that focuses on
care for the quality of the interactions and fusions with technology. Hybridization is
central in the approach: it is not to be rejected, neither is it the greatest danger, but it does
deserve the greatest care.
Keywords Michel Foucault . Technology . Ethics . Technical mediation .
Hybridization . Subjectivation
1 Introduction
Michel Foucault would probably not have defined himself as a philosopher of
technology. Still, his work does contain important insights for the field, which this
paper aims to explore. Foucault’s analysis of Bentham’s circular prison project, the
Panopticon, is well-known. The analysis is part of Foucault’s analysis of how the
human subject is governed and fashioned by “disciplinary power”. The relation
between the analysis of technology and power and Foucault’s later work on ethics
is barely considered, however. The elaboration of that relation opens the way for
Philos. Technol. (2012) 25:221–241
DOI 10.1007/s13347-011-0057-0
S. Dorrestijn (*)
Department of Philosophy, University of Twente, Room Cubicus B221, P.O. Box 217, 7500 AE
Enschede, Netherlands
e-mail: s.dorrestijn@gmail.com
research into how people govern and fashion themselves through their engagements
with technologies. This “extension” of “Foucault’s philosophy of technology” yields
an innovative, fruitful approach to the ethics of technology. At the same time, it
appears that the philosophy of technology constitutes an inspiring perspective for
studying Foucault’s work.
My reading and interpretation of Foucault’s work in this paper differs in two
respects. Firstly, Foucault is read through the lens of the philosophy of technology.
Secondly, his earlier work is reassessed from the perspective of his later work. In this
way I will recombine ideas of Foucault in a way that he has not done to any great
degree: I will show how the “power of technology” can be recombined with the
“aesthetics of existence” from his later work. The result is a new understanding of the
human subject in relation to the influence of technology. It emphasizes how users of
technology experience and operate transformations of their mode of existence by
engaging with new technologies. This view on “subjectivation through technology
use” offers on the one hand an alternative to the opposition between a technical and a
genuine human sphere that figures in most ethical evaluations of technology (critical
theory, Heidegger). On the other hand, while it has proven difficult to recombine
research on “technical mediation” and “hybridization” (Latour) with ethics, this is
precisely where “subjectivation and technical mediation” offers a new perspective.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In the next section I will introduce
and position Foucault as a philosopher of technology. Foucault can be com-
pared to critical theory and Heidegger, but is ultimately best associated with the
“technical mediation” approach (Latour, Ihde, Verbeek). The third section
explores and explicates Foucault’s contribution to the analysis of technical
mediation. This entails a detailed study of Discipline and Punish, resulting in the
identification of two distinct “figures of technical mediation”. The fourth and last
section deals with the ethics of technical mediation. I discuss Foucault’s later work on
ethics and his scheme of subjectivation. Next I employ this scheme for my own
purpose of elaborating an ethics of technology, by using it as a framework to assess
Foucault’s and other’s contemporary research into technology. The paper ends with a
concluding section.
2 Was Foucault a Philosopher of Technology?
The question as to whether or not Foucault was a philosopher of technology was
explicitly asked on at least two occasions, namely by Jim Gerrie (2003) and Edouard
Delruelle (2003). Both authors conclude that Foucault’s work is indeed very relevant
for scholars in the field of the philosophy of technology. Surprisingly, they both
largely neglect Foucault’s analysis of concrete technologies, an analysis which I
consider to be of central importance. The reason for this oversight appears to lie in
their search for the term “technology” in Foucault’s work rather than looking for
references to concrete technical objects. When Foucault speaks of “technology”, he
does not mean concrete tools or machines but instead he uses the term in a broader
sense, also denoting skills and methods or rationalities that govern people’s practices.
Thus in Discipline and Punish Foucault writes about “disciplinary technologies” as
methods of exercising disciplinary power. Similarly, the theme of “technologies of the
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self” in his late work refers to practices by which people try to structure and stylize
their way of living.
However, Foucault has on occasion explicitly explained his conception of the term
technology,1 as for example during an interview with Paul Rabinow on architecture.
Foucault says:
(…) what interests me more is to focus on what the Greeks called the tekhnē,
that is to say a practical rationality governed by a conscious goal. (…) The
disadvantage of this word tekhnē, I realize, is its relation to the word ‘technol-
ogy’, which has a very specific meaning. A very narrow meaning is given to
‘technology’: one thinks of hard technology, the technology of wood, of fire, of
electricity. Whereas government is also a function of technology: the govern-
ment of individuals, the government of souls, the government of the self by the
self, the government of families, the government of children and so on. I believe
that if one placed the history of architecture back in this general history of
tekhnē, in this wide sense of the word, one would have a more interesting
guiding concept than by the opposition between the exact sciences and the
inexact ones. (Foucault 2000a, p. 364)
In the bulk of Foucault’s work the focus is on government, and technology is
touched upon in that context. In the cited excerpt, however, Foucault begins with
“hard technologies” and then explains the relation to “government”. In doing so he
defines an approach for a philosophy of technology: the study of hard technologies in
relation to technology in the sense of government. The notable relevance of Foucault’s
work to the philosophy of technology is exactly this approach of revealing the role of
(hard) technology for governing and fashioning human subjects.2
In order to bring out the relevance of Foucault’s work for analyzing technology, it
is important to recognize the detailed historical and empirical research—where
concrete technologies play a role—which support his philosophical claims on how
the subject is governed and fashioned. His work becomes all the more relevant when
the shift in his work from power to subject constitution is taken into consideration. I
will present such a reading of Foucault through the lens of the philosophy of
technology, while at the same time combining his work on power with his later work
on the subject.3
1 I would like to acknowledge Grégoire Chamayou, who discussed this theme with me on the occasion of
his (unpublished) lecture, “Foucault, philosophe de la technique”, Séminaire Philosophie et sciences
humaines CNRS-EHESS-ENS, Paris, January 2006. Willcocks (2006) also discusses the same excerpt
from the interview with Foucault.
2 “Governing” is a recurrent term in Foucault’s work from his 1978 lecture on “Governmentality”, onwards
(Foucault 2000b). The term “fashioning” occurs in Discipline and Punish when Foucault speaks of the
human body as “a formless clay” that is transformed—in the military—into a soldier: a “body”, therefore,
“that is manipulated, shaped, trained…” (Foucault 1977, pp. 135–136). In French it reads: “corps qu’on
manipule, qu’on façonne, qu’on dresse (Foucault 1975, p. 138). Ian Hacking used the term in this sense in
his lectures at the Collège de France from 2001 and 2005: “Façonner les gens”.
3 Hans Achterhuis’ call for an empirical turn in the philosophy of technology and his attentiveness to the
concrete technologies in Foucault’s work (Achterhuis 1998) as well as Hub Zwart’s explorations of
Foucault’s later work in his essays on Foucault’s ethics of “discontent with technocracy” (Zwart 1995)
have been formative in the development of my approach (cf. Dorrestijn 2004, 2006). I gratefully acknowl-
edge Peter-Paul Verbeek for his enduring support and collaboration on Foucault and technology, as well as
his work on the theme (Verbeek 2011).
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To begin, I will now compare Foucault’s understanding and evaluation of the
relation between the human being and technology to other approaches in the philos-
ophy of technology. First, I will set Foucault’s thinking about technology apart from a
line of thought that tries to maintain a human sphere free of intrusion from technol-
ogy. Next I will argue that a fundamental hybridization of technology and humans
does not constitute the kind of greatest danger for Foucault as it does for Heidegger.
Finally, I will show how Foucault’s work on technology can be used to formulate a
philosophy of “technical mediation”, in line with contemporary thinkers such as
Bruno Latour and Don Ihde.
2.1 Struggle Between Spheres—Critical Theory
In Discipline and Punish, Foucault confronts the ideal of modernization as liberation
from irrational beliefs and power structures with an historical analysis that reveals
instead the rise of a disciplinary society made up of disciplined individuals (Foucault
1977, p. 218). The thesis of the spread of disciplinary power clearly resembles other
critiques of society and technology from the 1960s and 1970s.4 Many of those
critiques arose, in one way or another, from neo-Marxist thought and they often
evoke metaphors of struggle and radical transformation. Typically, a genuine human
sphere is seen as being threatened by a sphere in which power, consumerism, and
technology are prevalent. A “struggle between spheres” can be found in the classic
works of Marcuse (1964), and Habermas (1970), and also in more recent works
(explicitly acknowledging Foucault) by Poster (1984), Feenburg (2002), Negri and
Hardt (2000), and Stiegler (2008).5
Foucault’s analysis of disciplinary power does demonstrate some resemblance to
such a two spheres approach. His concept of “discipline” as a quasi autonomous
system of power is similar to a rushing sphere of technology. What sets Foucault apart
is that his moral stance towards the rise of discipline remains unclear. He neither
explicitly rejected the rush of discipline, nor did he formulate a program for stopping
it. This moral ambiguity confused and annoyed many readers.6 In his following book,
the first part of his History of Sexuality (which appeared in 1976) Foucault stated
“where there is power, there is resistance” (Foucault 1978, p. 95). This immediately
became a popular reference for showing that Foucault did have some kind of critical
political project.
However, in one of his last texts (from 1984), “What is Enlightenment?”, it
becomes clear that Foucault’s position is not (or at least is no longer) in accordance
with the conception of a struggle between spheres. He distances himself from
“projects that claim to be global or radical”, instead expressing his preference for
4 For example Andrew Feenberg, for the purpose of his “critical theory of technology”, compares
Foucault’s disciplinary power with Marcuse’s thesis of “one-dimensional man”. He considers Foucault’s
historical approach a “useful corrective” to Marcuse’s insights that remain “very general” (Feenburg 2002,
p. 67). Remarkable about Stiegler is that he does extensively refer to Foucault’s later work; however, in the
end he remains much closer to a Marxist scheme than Foucault does.
5 Other critiques of technology, for example the call for a “red line” as a limit to technical development by
Fukuyama (2002), as well as the work of Ellul (1964) and Jonas (1984) employ a similar strict distinction
between a human and technical sphere, however without sharing the neo-Marxist background.
6 Among them most notably: Jürgen Habermas, Charles Taylor and Nancy Fraser; see O’Leary (2002,
p. 160).
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“specific transformations” like those he had witnessed taking place in the 1960s and
1970s, for example in the relation between the sexes (Foucault 2000c, p. 316). He
also offers a reformulated account of the danger:
And we have been able to see what forms of power relation were conveyed by
various technologies (…). What is at stake, then, is this: How can the growth of
capabilities [capacités] be disconnected from the intensification of power
relations? (Foucault 2000c, p. 317)
The danger of “discipline” as a quasi autonomous system has been replaced by
critical attention to “disciplinary tendencies”. The tone is clearly more optimistic than
in Discipline and Punish. This is not, however, due to a simple reversal of winning
chances on the front line of the struggle between spheres. Instead, Foucault makes
explicit that power relations are inescapable; however this does not mean that humans
are merely victims of power. I will further elaborate this point by comparing Foucault
with Heidegger.
2.2 Ontological Deception—Heidegger
Martin Heidegger’s philosophy of technology offers the most substantial example of an
analysis where the relation between humans and technology tends to be fixed at a
fundamental, ontological level. In The question concerning technology (1977)
Heidegger asserts that our world is not only full of technical objects, but moreover,
on a deeper level our way of perceiving and interpreting the world has been reduced
to framing everything in technical terms. The contemporary understanding of Being,
termed Enframing, makes the world appear as a stock of recourses at the command of
man.
Heidegger’s position is beyond the model of a struggle between spheres, because
there is no place for a human sphere which is not yet affected by the technology. In a
similar way, Foucault affirms in Discipline and Punish that the human subject is
fundamentally marked by disciplinary power.
The man described for us, whom we are invited to free, is already in himself the
effect of a subjection much more profound than himself. (…) The soul is the
effect and instrument of a political anatomy; the soul is the prison of the body.
(Foucault 1977, p. 30)7
Moreover, in “What is Enlightenment?”, following his position against radical
transformations, Foucault formulates a doubt that sounds like Heidegger’s “gloomy
view”:
(… ) if we limit ourselves to this type of always partial and local inquiry or test,
do we not run the risk of letting ourselves be determined by more general
structures of which we may well not be conscious, and over which we may have
no control? (Foucault 2000c, p. 316)
7 While Plato has Socrates argue in the Phaedo for the existence of a “soul” to be liberated from
imprisonment by the “body”, Foucault suggests that the soul is only constructed in the imprisonment.
The soul is produced by discipline on the body, and then also serves discipline by monitoring the body.
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Ultimately, however, Foucault’s evaluation following this insight differs from
Heidegger’s. While affirming the deep, ontological connection that Heidegger draws
between humans and technology, Foucault nonetheless rejects the gloomy conclusion
and asserts that humans have to accept the impossibility of a sovereign position. In a
note in his working papers, written when he was working on his final books, Foucault
explicitly sets out the difference between himself and Heidegger.
For Heidegger, it was on the basis of Western tekhnē that knowledge of the
object sealed the forgetting of Being. Let’s turn the question around and ask
ourselves on the basis of what tekhnai was the Western subject formed and were
the games of truth and error, freedom and constraint, which characterize this
subject, opened up. (cited in Gros 2005, p. 523)
Contrary to Heidegger, Foucault holds that there is no genuine subject that is free
of constraints or not yet affected by technology. In “What is Enlightenment?”
Foucault asserts that, for him, the discovery of the historical conditions of the subject
is a problem that characterizes the stakes of modern philosophy. What he calls the
“attitude of modernity”, is the will to address the history of how the human subject
has been governed and fashioned. Foucault then unfolds an approach to philosophy
that he terms “critical ontology of ourselves”, which he conceives as being:
an attitude (…) in which the critique of what we are is at one and the same time
the historical analysis of the limits imposed on us and an experiment with the
possibility of going beyond them. (Foucault 2000c, p. 319)
Thus Foucault advocates philosophical research following a double-sided formula:
on the one hand promoting historical investigations into the ways in which modes of
existence have been conditioned so far, and on the other hand, suggesting practical
and experimental activities aimed at changing one’s mode of existence.
2.3 Hybrid Relations—Philosophy of Technical Mediation
Foucault’s critical ontology of the self distinguishes itself in its attentiveness to the
emergence and constitution of new modes of human existence. This corresponds with
the approach of “technical mediation” in recent philosophy of technology. Reacting
to the abstract and gloomy views of Ellul and Heidegger, scholars such as Don Ihde
and Bruno Latour have promoted a more empirically orientated philosophy of
technology. Their work is interdisciplinary, incorporating empirical and historical
research, and is associated as much with the field of Science and Technology Studies
as with Philosophy. Building on the work of Ihde and Latour, Peter-Paul Verbeek
(2005) has outlined a practice oriented philosophy of technology with “technical
mediation” as its main theme. He endorses research into “what things do”: the role of
concrete technologies as mediators of human experience and action.
A basic notion in the mediation approach is that human existence is always
influenced by technology. There is no original, and certainly not a clear cut distinc-
tion between humans and technology. Instead what is of interest are the different
kinds of human-technology relations (Ihde 1990). Humans are always hybrids of
supposedly human and technical aspects (Latour 1993). A problematic aspect of this
account of humans as hybrids is that it undermines the ethical stakes that inspired
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much of the philosophy of technology. Or, as Langdon Winner complained, research
on technology in the style of Science and Technology Studies had become “depoliti-
cized” (Winner 1993).
Paraphrasing the form of Winner’s conclusions, the following could be said with
respect to ethics in relation to technical mediation. While the approach of critical theory
was directed towards confining the sphere of technology in order to protect a core
human sphere, this attempt now appears infeasible, as the presupposition of clear
boundaries and limits are deemed illusory. In an approach like Heidegger’s, hybridiza-
tion is recognized as the greatest danger, while mediation theory just emphasizes the
inevitability of it. The cost of a more detailed account of technical mediations and the
hybrid form of human existence seems to be the loss of a solid ground for ethical claims.
Bruno Latour’s position is very interesting in this respect as he has endeavored to
bridge the gap between his descriptive analysis of technical mediation and ethics.
Latour asserts that technologies often guide or constrain human action. Car drivers’
slowing down for a speed bump does not occur as a result of their willingness to obey
the law but is the result of the intervention of a technical object. According to
Latour’s analysis, the action was “delegated” from humans to technology. This does
not mean the end of ethics, he thinks. Instead, he claims that those (sociologists) who
see a decline of morality (under postmodern conditions), would find the “missing
masses of morality” by recognizing that action is often delegated from humans to
artifacts (Latour 1992).
Usually, human agency and freedom are seen as necessary preconditions for ethics.
Only free subjects can respond to the call of a moral principle or law. Latour’s
approach does not address ethics in this framework; indeed his approach addresses
quite the opposite, that is, determination by external forces. Latour does not discover
the “missing masses of morality”, but rather reveals the “missing masses of disci-
plinary power”. 8 Foucault criticized the understanding of the autonomous subject by
revealing the history of disciplinary power in governing and fashioning human
beings. Latour’s research extends Foucault’s historical method with a method to
reveal how the mundane technologies of today constrain humans.
Thus far an understanding of the subject and of freedom and agency in
relation to technical mediation is lacking. As long as this understanding is
lacking, every instance of the influence of technology on human action can
only appear as a constraint to freedom and thereby a negation of ethics.
Foucault’s turn from the analysis of power to ethics helps to address this
problem. While Foucault’s earlier work is rightly seen as a dramatic attack on
the autonomous subject presupposed in modern ethics, his later work is
concerned with developing an alternative ethical framework wherein “the subject” is
not eliminated by revealing its external conditions. Foucault begins to understand ethics
as the active engagement of people with governing and fashioning their own way of
being in relation to conditioning circumstances. An extension of that framework to the
problem of technical mediation opens up a new perspective for ethics in relation to
technical mediation.
8 A similar case is made by Soren Riis (2008) for Heidegger and Latour. In his exploration of the
similarities between the two, he affirms that Latour does not depart from Heidegger, but instead, that
Latour’s actor–networks can be interpreted very much in line with Heidegger’s Enframing.
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2.4 Technical Mediation and Subjectivation
Although the similarities between Foucault’s analysis of modern society and the
analysis of critical theory or Heidegger have been often observed, I claim that a
more important and lasting contribution centers on the relation between Foucault’s
work and the mediation approach in the philosophy of technology.
Foucault’s contribution to a philosophy of technical mediation is twofold, following
the double-sided approach of his critical ontology of the self. First, his historical analysis
of disciplinary power addresses the role of technical mediation in how the subject is
governed and fashioned. His work complements the work of other researchers with
original examples and an analysis of the transformative power of technology. His
particular contribution, which is the subject of the next section, is visible in the
distinction between two different “figures of mediation”.
Second, Foucault’s call to complement historical analysis with experiment points
towards an ethics of technical mediation. The analysis of how technologies govern
and fashion humans becomes integrated into a broader philosophy of subjectivation.
The influences of technology no longer appear by definition as a negation of human
agency and freedom, but technical mediations becomes a concern and what is at stake
human practices of governing and fashioning oneself and others. With this Foucault’s
ethical perspective brings something new which has so far been largely absent from
the approach of mediation theory.
3 Figures of Technical Mediation
In order to explicate Foucault’s contribution to research in technical mediation, I will
turn to an analysis of the exact role technology plays in the way people are governed
and fashioned in Discipline and Punish. A detailed account of several parts of
Foucault’s study reveals two different figures of technical mediation.
3.1 Technical Determination of Power Relations
In order to investigate in detail the figures of technical mediation that Foucault
discerns, I first turn to the Panopticon and Foucault’s analysis of it. The Panopticon
is Bentham’s plan, dating from the end of the eighteenth century, for a circular prison.
A tower in the center allows the guard to inspect the cells which have been laid out as
an annular building around the tower. The cells have windows on the outside and on
the inner side, facing the tower. The tower is equipped with a net curtain so as to
allow the guards to inspect the cells without being seen themselves by the prisoners.
This is the essential architectural feature that generates a specific power relation
between guard and prisoners. Following Bentham, the technically supported regime
of continuous inspection would have an effect comparable to a strong form of moral
conscience, self-inspection. It would make a prisoner “lose the power to do evil and
almost the thought of wishing it” (Bentham 2002, p. 14).9
9 The quote is from a French edition, originally from 1791, a condensed translation and of the English text
that was also first published in 1791. Cf. Bentham (1995) for a contemporary English edition.
228 S. Dorrestijn
The relevance of this “simple architectural idea” (p. 11) is not restricted to the
prison. Bentham claims that his idea is a great invention that can be used wherever a
number of people have to be observed. He excitedly deliberates on the idea of
ubiquitous surveillance as a general model for society, in which everyone inspects
everyone else (Foucault 1977, pp. 200–209). Foucault was equally excited about the
idea, but for him, as for other critical thinkers, Bentham’s utopian image of a panoptic
society rather represented a dystopian nightmare.
The Panopticon is the most famous example of a technological object analyzed by
Foucault. Foucault was attracted to it because it represented such an emblematic
example of how modern institutions exercise power over people. Technology in the
sense of a material object is never Foucault’s main focus. However, even when
Foucault approached the Panopticon from the broader perspective of the government
of people, the remarkable architectural and material features pushed themselves to the
fore. At times, Foucault does single out the material aspect of the Panopticon and he
makes explicit the figure of technical mediation that he sees at work. The following
fragment is particularly illustrative:
Power has its principle not so much in a person as in a certain concerted
distribution of bodies, surfaces, lights, gazes; in an arrangement whose
internal mechanisms produce the relation in which individuals are caught
up. (p. 202)
In the context of modern, disciplinary society, power does not mean having the
authority to govern others. The effect of governing and influencing people has now
become integrated into the material and procedural layout of disciplinary institutions.
This is particularly evident in the Panopticon, in which the configuration ensures that
someone in the central tower can see everyone in the surrounding cells without being
seen. Technical mediation here takes the form of strong compulsion, albeit not by
direct mechanical force, but via an inescapable play of power relations. Once the
panoptic configuration is installed, the specific power effect takes effect. I will
therefore characterize this first figure of technical mediation as the technical deter-
mination of power relations.
3.2 Training of Technically Mediated Routines
The determination figure related to the Panopticon is appealing for reasons of
clarity and strength. Interestingly, Foucault does not use the Panopticon to
discover the structure of disciplinary power. The Panopticon only serves as
the summit of his claims about disciplinary power. After 50 pages of historical
description and analysis of discipline in the military, schools, factories, and
hospitals, Foucault concludes by doubting that it may be “somewhat excessive
to derive such power from the petty machinations of discipline” (p. 194). The
Panopticon is introduced only then so as to remove any doubts about the
importance and scope of the claims about disciplinary power. Prior to the turn
to Bentham’s Panopticon, the section on discipline is concerned with the
structure of discipline in institutions. These pages are equally important for
the philosophy of technology as the pages on the Panopticon, because Foucault
develops another figure of technical mediation. The research is focused mainly
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on documents from the archives containing directives and instructions. One
example of such an instruction concerns the training of writing at school:
(…) the part of the left arm from the elbow must be placed on the table. The
right arm must be at a distance from the body of about three fingers and about
three fingers from the table, on which it must rest lightly. The teacher will place
the pupils in the posture that they should maintain when writing, and will
correct it either by sign or otherwise, when they change this position. (p. 152)
Another example concerns directives for shooting from the military:
Bring the weapon forward. In three stages. Raise the rifle with the right hand,
bringing it closer to the body so as to hold it perpendicular with the right knee,
the end of the barrel at eye level, grasping it by striking it with the right hand,
the arm held close to the body at waist height. At the second stage, bring the
rifle in front of you with the left hand (…). (p. 153)
It is not the case in these examples that once the technical object is introduced, a
certain effect of power is necessarily imposed. However, this is not to say that these
practices and the technologies used do not have any impact on the subject. Foucault
emphasizes the training of routines which are involved in the assembling of the
human body and technologies:
This is an example of what might be called the instrumental coding of the body.
It consists of a breakdown of the total gesture into two parallel series: that of the
parts of the body to be used (…) and that of the parts of the object. (p. 153)
As practically all gestures of the body depend on some sort of association with
technologies, these fusions or hybridizations of humans and technology structure our
mode of existence.
Furthermore, what is specific to Foucault’s analysis is that it becomes clear that
these fusions between humans and technology are not just given, but have to be
forged by training. The revelation of the aspect of training (drilling in the military
context), facilitates awareness of the transformative mediations of such mundane
technologies, the use of which seems very natural and not morally significant. The
mediation effect in these examples does not have the form of an inescapable coercion,
but takes the form of a structuring of routines. By drawing attention to the degree of
training necessary for these routines to function, Foucault makes clear that the pencil
and rifle are not just used, but become integrated into the user’s mode of existence.
This second figure of technical mediation in Foucault is adequately described as the
training of technically mediated routines.
3.3 Figures of Technical Mediation
It appears that Discipline and punish does not conclude with one ultimate theory
about the power of technology, but rather two different exemplary mediation effects,
or “figures of technical mediation” can be discerned. The first, elaborated in the
context of Bentham’s utopian project of the Panopticon, can be characterized as the
determination of power relations. Looking closely at Foucault’s analysis of concrete,
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existing disciplinary institutions leads to the discovery of a second mediation figure,
where the impact is less coercive, only imposed by training of technically mediated
gestures.
In the aforementioned interview on architecture, Foucault stresses that the deter-
mination figure of technical mediation should not be seen as the ultimate one. In the
discussion, he refers to a study on the social effects of the emergence of the chimney
in houses:
It is certain, and of capital importance that this technique [the chimney] was a
formative influence on new human relations, but it is impossible to think that it
would have been developed and adapted had there not been in the play and
strategy of human relations something which tended in that direction. What is
interesting is always interconnection, not the primacy of this over that, which
has never any meaning. (Foucault 2000a, p. 362)
As discussed before, Foucault’s analysis of disciplinary power and the Panopticon
does show similarities with the figure of a struggle between spheres that can still be
won (critical theory) or appears to be lost (Heidegger). However, here Foucault
clearly advances an understanding of the importance of technology in line with the
approach of technical mediation: affirming that interconnections are important, and
not the primacy of either a technological or a human sphere.
Discipline and Punish—the book in which Foucault most extensively takes
technology into account—contributes to the understanding of technical mediation
by showing how the human subject is fashioned and governed by technology. I
identified two exemplary effects, two figures of mediation that are explicitly men-
tioned and elaborated by Foucault. These are only the principle figures; a more
detailed account would show more variations.10 In my interpretation, Foucault does
not offer one ultimate theory about technology, but he does suggest that an explora-
tion of the multiple figures of technical mediation is the appropriate continuation after
the acknowledgement of hybridization.
4 Subjectivation: Ethics and Technical Mediation
With the double-sided formula of a critical ontology of the self, Foucault promoted
historical research into the conditions of the subject and a reflection on and experi-
mentation with new forms of existence. Until Discipline and Punish, Foucault’s work
was concerned with how the subject had been governed and fashioned. The second
part, of governing and fashioning one’s own existence, was largely absent. Moreover,
if it was present, it was treated in a biased way, as the formation of modes of existence
was presented as resulting exclusively from disciplinary power. Only in his later work
10 For example, using the approach of technical mediation figures, it is possible to trace (in Discipline and
Punish) the references that enabled Foucault to learn to acknowledge the importance of technology.
Foucault (1977, p. 141) cites Ariès (1960) from whom he may have learned that social and technical
change accompany each other. He also refers to Canguilhem (1966) (Foucault 1977, p. 184), who affirms
that normalization processes as found in technology development also effectuate normalization of social
relations. Finally, Bentham’s Panopticon allowed Foucault to elaborate on the notion that the influence of
technology can be all pervasive and determining.
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did Foucault begin to take into consideration people’s own concerns about the
conditions of their existence. Research into ancient arts of existence provided
inspiration to Foucault with respect to how to give expression to this theme and
to develop it in relation to moral philosophy. In this section I will introduce
Foucault’s turn to ethics and the theme of subjectivation. I will then apply
Foucault’s framework of subjectivation to the domain of technology, in order to
work towards an ethics of technical mediation.
4.1 Ethics of Subjectivation
Foucault worked on a series of books on the history of sexuality. The first part from
1976, The will to Knowledge, gives a programmatic outline of the project, very much
in line with the approach followed in Discipline and Punish. However, the project
took a very different direction. In later books, The Use of Pleasure and The care of the
Self from 1984, the focus is no longer on modernity but on ancient Greece and Rome.
Rather than studying the mechanisms of power that subjugate people, Foucault
focuses on how people govern and fashion themselves. The resulting books are about
the history of sexuality, but also have much wider relevance as a genealogy of ethics.
Foucault’s earlier research into power seemed incompatible with ethics. Indeed, it
was from beginning to end a vehement critique of that basic assumption in modern
philosophy which is the notion of the free, autonomous subject. In Antiquity,
Foucault discovered that ethics rather concerned the “art of living”. This ethics did
not employ the figure of a free subject called to respond to the duty of moral law.
Instead, the emphasis was on the practical skills and exercises of governing and
fashioning oneself. This practical knowledge was concerned with how one achieves
mastery over one’s own course of action and way of living. In this framework, the
subject does not function as a necessary presupposition, but is itself the issue at stake.
Thus, Foucault discovered a conception of ethics where the central concern is with
the constitution of the subject, the emergence or formation of a self with self-reflexive
experience and the competence of self-conduct. Foucault uses the term subjectivation,
denoting the process of “becoming a subject”.
This extension of moral theory, from reflection on free subjects responding to law,
to the formation of specific instances of subjectivity, makes it possible to link
Foucault’s work on power to ethics. In retrospect, subjectivation can also be seen
as the main theme in Foucault’s earlier work. In fact, Foucault showed that disciplinary
practices shape the kind of subject that modern philosophy takes for granted.11 This
earlier research is now being reconsidered and complemented by research into how
people engage in shaping their own mode of being. As noted before, Foucault
expressed this himself with the double-sided formula of a critical ontology of the
self (exploring historical conditions and experimenting with changing the condi-
tions). This formula can therefore be seen as an attempt to integrate the discovery
of the ancient ethics of subjectivation with a contemporary critical philosophical
approach. The experimental approach to transforming one’s own conditioned mode
of existence converges with Foucault’s call for a new “aesthetics of existence”.
11 Similarly, Foucault’s work on knowledge was implicitly concerned with the kinds of subjects that are
evoked when people define themselves and others as subjects through everyday and scientific discourse.
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Foucault asserts that subjectivation is fundamental to any ethical system. His
genealogy of ethics reveals how, during the course of history different understandings
of the subject and different experiences of being a subject have prevailed. In
structuring this genealogy, Foucault distinguished four dimensions of subjectivation
and investigated how different ethical systems differ along these dimensions. The
scheme of subjectivation comprises ethical substance, subjection mode, ethical elab-
oration, and telos (see Foucault 1992, pp. 25–32; 2000d, pp. 262–269).12
The same scheme can also be employed for tracing and articulating shifting ethical
experiences of today. Foucault himself suggests—particularly in interviews—that a
contemporary renewal in ethics could be inspired by the ancient aesthetics of
existence. In the following paragraphs, I will follow up on Foucault’s suggestions
and apply the four dimensions of subjectivation to the contemporary problem of the
relation between humans and technology. I will reconsider the influence of technol-
ogy on humans from the perspective of subjectivation. How have humans perceived
the influences of technology and accommodated them in elaborating themselves as
hybrid beings, attached in many ways to technologies? I will introduce an analysis of
figures of technical mediation in a broader approach, that is, an ethics of technical
mediation.
In the next four paragraphs, I will discuss the four dimensions of subjectivation
separately. First I will explain what Foucault refers to with each specific aspect. Next,
I will sketch how Foucault himself used it for his history of ethics and for a renewal in
contemporary ethics. Finally, I will explain how the subjectivation aspects can be
used in the project of elaborating a contemporary ethics of technical mediation.
4.2 Ethical Substance: the Hybrid Self
With the ethical substance, Foucault designates the part of the self where people’s
concern and efforts of improvement are directed, the substance that is being fash-
ioned. Foucault’s genealogical research addresses how different ethical systems
operate with different conceptions of the self. In the case of sexual ethics, the point
for the Greeks was to make appropriate use of the range of possible acts of pleasure,
thereby fashioning one’s moral character in confrontation with the opinion of others.
Later, in Christianity, the self was identified with intentions that had to remain free of
inappropriate desires, or seductions by an evil power. The will is also the center of
Kantian ethics. In ancient sexual ethics, acts of pleasure and their social consequences
functioned as the ethical substance, while in Christian and modern ethics this shifted
to the will which must be adjusted to God’s will or to universal reason. Ancient ethics
12 As Deleuze (1988) first noticed, Foucault’s scheme retrieves the Aristotelian fourfold of material, formal,
efficient, and teleological causation. In Heidegger’s essay on technology, the same causality scheme
structures the argument. Foucault’s ethics, as combined with technology in this paper, and Heidegger’s
approach to technology thus share the reference to the Aristotelian modes of causation. This offers the
possibility of comparison. For Heidegger, engaging with technology implies reducing the multiplicity of
causation to efficient cause alone, which means the “forgetting of Being”, he thinks. Foucault’s late work
implicitly replies to Heidegger, claiming that by turning attention to how the subject engages in the
causation of itself (subjectivation), the various dimensions of causation can still be found. This means that
technology is indeed always involved in the constitution of the subject like Heidegger feared, but at the
same time it means that technology is not as one-dimensional as Heidegger suggested. Cf. the earlier
quotation from Foucault in Gros (2005).
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functioned without this notion of a will, just focusing on actual acts and their
consequences for a person’s virtuous, respectable moral character.
Whereas Foucault studied subjectivation in relation to sexuality, I want to inves-
tigate the relation between subjectivation and technology, in order to elaborate a
contemporary ethics of technology. The question is then how people perceive and
conceptualize the influence of technology on themselves (and others, human beings
in general). The different “figures of technical mediation” that Foucault and other
scholars have discovered are such problematizations. Articulations of the mediating
effects of technology are simultaneously ethical problematizations of how one’s own
mode of existence is affected by technology. Whereas the ancients tried to make
sensible use of pleasure, today’s challenge concerning the ethics of technology is to
carefully engage with technologies because of the implied self-transformations. The
ethical substance, the self as it appears as a matter of concern and care, can be defined
as hybrid self, or the technically mediated self. In this way, I can transfer research on
technical mediation into the framework of subjectivation. The influences of technol-
ogy on humans become an integral part of ethics, as they constitute the matter that
ethics cares about and gives form to (ethical substance).
My conception of the hybrid self as ethical substance differs from the ethical
substance functioning in critical theory and Heidegger. Critical theory’s conception of
the rush of a technology against which a genuine human sphere must be defended,
employs an idea of human existence that is essentially free of technology but
threatened with erosion by technology as ethical substance. A subject equally unaf-
fected by technology figures in Heidegger’s thought, although he fears the erosion is
beyond the point of return. I argued that, in line with the approach of technical
mediation, Foucault argues against a fundamental dividing line between what is
human and what is technical. Ethics of technology does not entail defending what
is genuinely human, but caring for the quality of one’s hybrid mode of being.
The recombination that I make here between Foucault’s analysis of technology and
his ethics of subjectivation opens up a new space in the philosophy of technical
mediation. Thus far, technical mediation research has focused on describing “what
technologies do”. In the framework of subjectivation and technology, the focus is on
“how technologies change what I do, what humans do”. The analysis of technical
mediation becomes a hermeneutic activity of exploring the influences on human
existence that are part of the broader, ethical project of governing and fashioning
one’s own existence. This does entail “a return to the subject”. However, this hybrid
self is very clearly not a return to the modern conception of the free, autonomous
subject.
4.3 Subjectivation Mode: from Law to Style
The second aspect which Foucault discerns as part of the structure of subjectivation is
the subjectivation mode. It denotes the way in which people feel forced, invited, or
encouraged to engage in ethics. For centuries, the main motive for ethical engage-
ment was the acknowledgement of a duty, stemming from divine or rational moral
laws. In Antiquity, Foucault finds, the motivation for moral behavior rather had an
aesthetical character, a will to style. With respect to sexual ethics, the ancients hardly
acknowledged absolute codes, but felt that they had to make proper, moderate use of
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acts of pleasure, because their behavior would establish a style of living and their
publically visible character. The modern configuration of the subject as free will
called to obey absolute law is confronted here with the ancient alternative of a moral
character to be configured from multiple possible behaviors where the motive to do
so is to attain style.
In the modern West, ethics was identified with obeisance to such a degree that the
process of subjectivation was concealed. It was largely overlooked that the modern free
but obedient subject was not given, but, as Foucault had tried to reveal, was fashioned by
disciplinary practices. Initially, Foucault had contested code-based modern ethics, by
revealing its hidden complement of disciplinary power. He went on to consider the
decreasing authority of absolute laws as a broader phenomenon that prompted the
articulation of an alternative to obedience for a contemporary ethics.
… the idea of ethics as obeisance to a code of rules is in the course, at the
moment, of disappearing, has already disappeared. And the answer to this
absence of ethics is, must be, a research of the kind of an aesthetics of existence.
(Foucault 2001, II, p. 1551.)
Foucault’s genealogy of ethics shows that abandoning compelling law implies the
end of a certain kind of ethics, but does not need to be the end of ethics altogether. In
the ancient arts of living, the reason for engaging in ethics was not duty but the wish
to give style to one’s existence and to earn the respect of peers. This ancient model
served Foucault as an example when he tried to consider an alternative ethics
encountering challenges raised by today’s changing ethical experience.
The idea of the bios as a material for an aesthetic piece of art is something that
fascinates me. The idea also that ethics can be a very strong structure of
existence, without any relation with the juridical per se, with an authoritarian
system, with a disciplinary structure. (Foucault 2000d, p. 260)
Foucault thus considers how contemporary ethics can once more find its motive in
an aesthetics of existence, where the subjectivation process could again take the form
of care of the self instead of institutionalized disciplinary practices under the authority
of law.
With respect to one’s engagement with technologies, attaining style can also be a
motivation as an alternative to the now problematic notion of absolute law. Ethics can
comprise care for the style and the quality of our hybrid modes of existence. This
seems a logical but as yet hardly elaborated extension of the philosophy of technical
mediation.
A comparison with Latour can illustrate this point. When Latour used the notion of
delegation as a means of solving the problem with morality and technology, his
vocabulary remained caught within the modern framework of code-based ethics. For
‘delegation’ meant the transfer of ‘obligation’ from ‘our hearts’ to our ‘apparatuses’
(Latour 2002, p. 253; 1992). Moreover, although Latour further declared that the
form in which one usually recognizes morality, that of ‘obligation’, ‘does not
properly belong to it’ (Latour 2002, p. 254), he has not yet offered an elaboration
of what ethics can be if it is not obligation. Foucault’s proposal for an aesthetics of
existence offers such an ethics that is not code based, and is therefore helpful in
further elaborating an ethics of technical mediation.
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The decisive point is that behavioral constraints by technologies should not be
seen as replacing moral law, but as part of the hybrid character of the self that one can
problematize and actively shape. Technical mediations should thus be understood
under the aspect of the ethical substance and not of the subjection mode. Ethics is
then not about obeying, subjecting to technology, but about concern for the influences
of technology and the wish to give style to our hybrid form of existence.13
4.4 Ethical Elaboration: Training Practices for Hybridization
Moral laws or aesthetic choices of style may define a mode of existence, but effort
and exercise is required to adjust one way of being to this form. Foucault calls this
ethical elaboration. This aspect of ethics has been neglected in theories of ethics
which focus on compelling codes, but was at the forefront of the ancient aesthetics of
existence. Foucault emphasized the importance of what he called technologies (in the
sense of method) or practices of the self in ancient ethics, such as meditation, diet,
and consultation with a mentor. In modern times, these exercises have become
separated from ethics. The practice of the care of the self has become progressively
delegated to disciplinary institutions.
With respect to technology, studying ethical elaboration involves exploring the
activities whereby people get attached to technologies and accommodate mediation
effects in their existence. For a contemporary ethics of technology, ethical elaboration
can be defined as training practices for hybridization. In Discipline and Punish,
Foucault extensively treated the training of routines, but exclusively in the context of
disciplinary institutions. At best, training took on the character of education, but
mostly that of drilling. The study of subjectivation in relation to technology use,
inspired by the late Foucault, must be disentangled from the exclusive focus on
drilling, to focus instead on how every day practices of using technology implicate
subjectivation. For example, training of technically mediated gestures is necessary
even to be able to sleep in a bed. It may seem convenient, comfortable, and very
natural, but it has to be trained. Children frequently drop out of their beds. In addition,
they need training and habituation to stop them wetting their beds. Once these skills
have become routines, one tends to forget ever having learned them. However, every
day experience and behavior is dependent on these basic skills and related
technologies.
In my view, three domains appear privileged for research on the constitution of
subjectivity through technology use. The first domain is the domestication of technology
as studied by historians of technology and researchers in Science and Technology
Studies. Historian Edward Tenner (2003), for example, has emphasized how the
innovation of technologies is accompanied by and depends on the development of
techniques of use. Tenner follows up on Marcel Mauss’ concept of body techniques.
He describes how the development of technologies (for example specific footwear,
from flip-flops to running shoes) and techniques of using (particular walking gaits, up
to foot adjustments) mutually influence and support each other. Knut Sørensen—a
proponent of “domestication studies” in Science and Technology Studies—focuses
13 In this respect, Verbeek (2011) remains closer to Latour than to my interpretation of Foucault, when he
identifies the constraining power of technology as the mode of subjection.
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on the way in which users actively “tame” new technologies. According to Sørensen
(2005), the domestication perspective “adds subjectivity” to Latour’s actor–network
approach, where users are approached as mere effects in networks of relations.
Foucault’s framework helps to bring out the ethical relevance of this addition of
subjectivity. Such taming should be seen as exercising work, carried out in order to
accommodate the effects of technology, whereby people transform their own mode of
being. In Foucault’s framework this can be rephrased as the ethical elaboration, and
thus is an integral part of ethics as subjectivation. Combining these existing research
traditions with Foucault’s framework of ethics as subjectivation makes the relevance
for ethics much clearer.
Pilots and usability tests in design and engineering comprise a second domain in
which Foucault’s ethics can help to articulate the ethical relevance of current practice.
Tests are normally performed to examine the technical functioning of new products.
These moments also offer a privileged possibility to observe technologies in use for
the first time. From the perspective of subjectivation, it should be stressed that testing
must not be seen as a last check moment, which marks the transfer of a product from
its design phase to its use phase. Instead, pilots and tests offer the possibility to see
how the accommodation of technology by users takes place, in an experimental
setting, and with the possibility of making adjustments to the technology (for an
example see Dorrestijn 2009).
Artistic explorations of technology comprise a third domain in which training
practices for hybridization can be studied. Petran Kockelkoren (2003) has shown that
artists have often dealt with the confusion caused by new technologies. Following
Helmuth Plessner, Kockelkoren analyses the user’s confused experiences as a “decen-
tering” of the subject. As artists explore the challenges of new technologies, they
contribute to a cultural learning process, that, again after Plessner, can result in a
“recentering” of the subject. Therefore Kockelkoren is interested in art and fairground
installations where visitors can experiment with new technologies. At the time of the
introduction of the train, one could find train simulating installations at fairgrounds,
where panels with painted landscapes were moved by at high speeds while visitors
were seated in a train wagon. Such installations, as well as poetic descriptions and
paintings of landscapes blurred by the rapid movement, Kockelkoren analyses,
allowed people to get their senses accustomed to the high speed experience. Not all
art is concerned with training practices for hybridization, but Kockelkoren (2007)
affirms that this “research activity” is an important cultural role that artists can play
today.
4.5 Telos: Our Own Devices
The last aspect of the subjectivation scheme is the telos. In any configuration of
ethics, subjectivation proceeds in the light of a goal. This is especially clear in
Christianity, where the hope for an afterlife serves as a telos for ethics. Kant, who
attempted to make ethics independent of religious belief, left the telos merely implicit
as he emphasized duty regardless of any reward. Foucault’s view is that the telos of
(sexual) ethics in antiquity was self-mastery, as opposed to being slave to one’s
passions. The point was not to be independent of external powers, but to achieve
the attitude and skills to actively cope with those influences, so that one conducted
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oneself. This capacity is what Foucault came to understand as freedom: not a state of
independence, but a “practice” of conducting oneself by actively coping with external
powers. The ethics of Antiquity thus had a telos inside this world and inside the lives
of people, a vision about what kind of subject one wanted to be.
Those who have commented on Foucault’s late work have conjectured that, in
Foucault’s proposal for a renewed aesthetics of existence the telos would be “free-
dom” (O’Leary 2002) or “disassembling the self” (Rabinow 2000). These visions
clearly reflect Foucault’s view that the subject is not a fixed entity, nor that it can be
cast in a universal mold. Both notions are negative, presenting continual transforma-
tion of oneself as a goal in itself. This is definitely in accordance with Foucault’s
thought: criticism of universal norms in place and a hesitance to propose alternatives.
Still, Foucault has also stressed that “liberation” remains a hollow phrase if it is not
complemented by innovation of alternative modes of existence. On a concrete level,
facing concrete problems, it should be possible to give more flesh to the vision of the
self that ethics aims to achieve. The interaction and fusion with technology is such a
concrete domain of problems. The telos in an ethics of technology is a guiding vision
for the design and use of technology that mediates human existence. This vision can
be articulated as the aim to design and accommodate technologies so that they
become our own devices (cf. Tenner 2003). The point is not to remain free of the
influences of technology, but instead to achieve the experience of freedom, agency,
conducting oneself, by actively coping with the effects of technologies.
Relevant in this respect is the notion of “libertarian paternalism”, proposed by
Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein (2008) as an ethical vision that can guide the
design of technologies that influence (“nudge”) human choices and actions. With the
term “paternalism”, they take into account the constant mediating effect of technol-
ogy on people’s behavior, and argue that the point is not to try to avoid this, but to
make good use of it. With the term “libertarian”, they stress that nudges should be
designed in such a way that they are not compelling, but still leave people the choice
to refuse them. Pragmatically, this seems a feasible and helpful position with regard to
freedom and technical mediation. Philosophically, there remains the problem that
there is no clear distinction between nudges that set people free and nudges that
compel. Foucault’s understanding of freedom as a practice helps better under-
standing what libertarian nudging could be. The kind of freedom that Thaler
and Sunstein want to preserve is not as they themselves somewhat suggest a
clearly determined disposition (between coercion and respect for freedom).
Rather it must be understood as the situated experience of people of having
mastery over their own actions in Foucault’s sense.
A better philosophical understanding of freedom in relation to technical mediation
is offered by Carrie Noland. The point of departure in her study Agency and
Embodiment (2009) is dissatisfaction with the dissolution of the subject in Foucault’s
work on power. Without reference to Foucault’s later work, but definitely congruent
with his work, she searches for a new understanding of the subject and of agency, one
that accounts for external influences rather than being opposed to them. Noland
comes to understand agency as the experiences of (new) “I can’s” arising from
performing gestural routines and improvising new variations. This experience of an
“I can”, does not appear in the absence of technologies, but arises as a sense of
mastery in performing technically mediated gestures.
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The telos of an ethics of mediation is the achievement of hybrid modes of being,
such that technical devices become our own and are not experienced as constraining
or alienating. This does not imply being free of technologies, but having achieved
mastery in interaction with technologies. Limiting the intensity of technology matters
less than caring for the quality of interaction, be it with primitive or highly advanced
technologies. As design and usability theorist Donald Norman (2007) puts it, the
challenge is to achieve technologies that allow for “natural” or “symbiotic” interaction.
However, what should be added is that the experience of natural interaction is not an
original, pre-technical state of being, but rather is an achievement at the end of a process
of successful training and fashioning oneself in relation to technologies. Norman does
not acknowledge or explicate this. In the same way, the telos set by Thaler and Sunstein,
libertarian paternalism, should not be understood as “nudges that still let people free”,
but as a mode of interaction that has the quality of allowing for the experience of
mastery.
5 Conclusion
Foucault’s work is relevant for thinking about technology because he considered the
role of technology in the way in which the human subject is fashioned and governed.
At first sight, his work on power seems the most relevant. In his later work on
subjectivation and ethics, technology is absent. However, by recombining Foucault’s
work on power with his work on subjectivation, his work contributes to solving
pertinent problems in current approaches to the ethics of technology.
In order to do this, Foucault’s earlier work must be reassessed from the perspective
of his later work. The focus is no longer exclusively on disciplinary power that
produces the human subject. Instead, the focus is on how people are themselves
involved in becoming subjects. Foucault advocates philosophical research that is a
critical ontology of ourselves: simultaneously investigations into the historical con-
ditions of ourselves as subjects, and practical experiments of transforming one’s
existence. The work on power, including the role of technologies, appears to have
dealt only with the first half. In Discipline and Punish, I identified two principal
figures of technical mediation: the determination of power relations and the training
of mediated gestures. Next, I showed how the analysis of figures of technical
mediation can be extended and complemented by research into how people govern
and fashion themselves through their engagements with technologies. In order to this,
I used the four-dimensional scheme that Foucault used to study subjectivation.
The result is a contribution to an ethics of technology inspired by Foucault’s
proposal for a contemporary aesthetics of existence. In this ethical perspective,
technical mediation and hybridization are not seen as opposing what is genuinely
human, but as the very material of ethical activity and reflection. The motivation for
this ethics is not absolute law, but a will to give style to the way one is transformed
through engagement with new technologies. The practical efforts and skills needed to
accommodate and integrate technologies into our modes of existence become a
pivotal aspect of ethics. As an alternative to mere resistance against intruding powers
(which seemed for a long time the typical ethical attitude one could derive from
Foucault’s work), this approach explores the active form-giving activities of subjects
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with respect to their hybrid mode of being. The aim of this ethics of technology is to
establish interactions and fusions with technologies in such a way that they are
experienced as one’s own, not obstructing but becoming part of one’s experience
and performance of freedom and agency.
The ethics of technology developed here after Foucault focuses on care for the
quality of interactions and fusions with technology. Hybridization is central to the
approach: it is not to be rejected, neither is it the greatest danger, but it does deserve
the greatest care.
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